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ONTOLOGICAL POSSialLITIES: SPORT AS PLAY 
by 
Scott Kretchmar 
lt is often thought that play and sport are highly, if not totally, incompatible. 
The competitive projects of sport stand at odds with the freedom, spontaneity 
and lack of seriousness thoughl to be characteristic of play. The extreme goal 
orientation of sport, including the drive to win, the quest for honor and the 
thirst for excellence, seems to beg a work, nol a play, orientation. It is more 
correct to say, so the argument runs, that one worlzs sport, not plays sport. 
In this paper an opposing viewpoint i s  presented. lt is maintained that the 
competitive fullness of sport and the play gesture are, in a most fundamental 
sense, wholly compatible but not coextensive. One can play sport without com­
promising elements essenliail lo this highly polarized activity. 
The starting point of this analysis .s the identification of a given experience 
which has been lived in it.s fundamental aspects repeatedly. This phenomenon, 
including the two aspects of playing and that which is played (sport), is taken as 
the datum for subsequent scrutiny. Thus, the question suggested by the tltle­
Onlological Possibilities: Sport as Play-is not one of sport as play or as some­
thing-other-than-play, but a question of the nature of sport as one mode of 
play. An attempt is made to reduce :he play and agnostic elements to funda­
mental levels and reveal their relat.ior.ship. The only "conclusions" drawn are 
descriptions of sport as play, namely-opposition as play and physically strategic 
opposition as play. 
Some may wish to argue that. laking a sC.arting point with a given phenomenon 
is unwarranted. Each time that one steps onto a ball diamond, so the critique 
might. run, he experiences many different phenomena. Sometimes he's happy, 
sometimes sad, sometimes highly competitive and sometimes noncompetitive. 
How can a given phenomenon be taken as sport in the play realm? But the 
phenomenon identified is a reality whether or not persons encounter it fre­
quently or infrequently in certain social settings. One can identify a distinctive 
cognition and can be " . . .  aware of the object. as being the same as that which 
(he) may expect to be aware of in a future experience. as the same as that which, 
generally speaking, (he) may be aware of in an indefinite number of present.ative 
acts."1 Thus, the lack of concern for establishing the identity of sport as play 
on a majority report of lived experience in a given social setting indicates that 
the reality or the phenomenon to be described does not depend upon social 
observation. Agreement is found with Willard who stated that " . . .  cognizance is 
just as cold and hard a fact, is just as rr.uch a phase of reality, as is the growth of 
a tree, the chemical composition of water, or the motion of a planet."2 
But it could be argued at this point that if one identifies a phenomenon for 
analysis, the very identification thereoi presupposes a knowledge of that datum. 
Any subsequent analysis would be nothing more than the gratuitous activity of 
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describing that which was already known. However, an ability t.o identify a 
phenomenon is quite distinct. from an ability to fully describe it. One- can, as it 
were, pick many things out of a crowd without being able, in their absence, Lo 
describe them. This draws attention to t.wo kinds of knowing (the traditional dis­
tinction between "knowing how" and "knowing that"). Thus the identification 
of a phenomenon does not preclude Lhe possibility of describing the yet obscure 
or unknown. 
An import.ant aspect of the present procedure involves "bracketing" the 
phenomenon. An attempt is made to gain an access to the datum which is un­
contaminated by social, psychological or biological bias. The phenomenon is 
"disconnected" fro:-n the context in which one lives it for I.he purpose of 
"seeing" it. more clearly. A search is made for I.he very roots of it.s intelligibility. 
While one has no as5urance that. the "bracketed" phenomenon is ever fuUy des­
cribed, t.he analysis is one which "transcends" the accidents of particular situa­
tions in favor of more general distinctions and connections. 
A consideration of t.his stance in relationship to several others which bave 
confronted the issues of sport., play and/or games may help to clarify the 
rationale for the aforemenLioned procedure. Neale, Callais and Schiller produced 
descriptions of play which, while they may be compatible with one another, 
have not been reduced to their possible common bases. Neale, speaking from a 
psychological standpoint, stated that play is adventure which itself is composed 
of freedom, delight, illusion, and peace. 3 Callais in surveying the relationship 
between play and other social forms of behavior indicated that play " . . .  remains 
separate, inclosed, in principle devoid of important repercussions upon the 
solidarity and continuity of collective and it1st.itutional life.114 Finally, Schiller, 
from an aesthetic standpoint, stated, "We must therefore do justice to those who 
pronounce the beautiful, and the disposition in which it. places I.he mind, as 
entirely indifferent and unprofitable, in relation Lo knowledge and feeaing."5 
The question must then be put.: in terms of these three perspectives, is I.here an 
identifiable common base? While each description provides a broad foundation 
which itself would support numerous particular lived experiences or social inter­
actions, Lhe analyses still leave important questions unanswered. For example, 
on what basis is illusion, unimportance and indifference intelligib.e? One can 
reduce Lhe experiences further and more fully describe them. 
The procedure employed in this paper requires that. one begin wit.h his lived 
experience and as such diverges radically from a second approach lo the issues 
surrounding sport as play , namely-the biological and biologicalJy-based psycho­
logical theories. Schiller6 and subsequently Spenser's 7 Dotion of play as a manj­
testation of excess energy, Lazarus•8 view of play as recovery from work, 
Hall's9 recapitulation lheory and Groos•lO teleological concept of play as pre­
paration for adult life are representative or this standpoint. While this is not the 
place to critique each theory separatelyll several possible problems relative to 
this general approach should be noted. 
First, the biological criteria for play are ((realities" which cannot be ex­
perienced or lived. One does not confront genetic operations or purposeful bio­
logical mechanisms but. things such as colors, shapes, bats, balls, joy and anxiety. 
114 
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Curiously t play is defined as somethi.1g which lws lo be present (e.g. recapitula­
tion) bul which cannot be experienced. As Groos stated, "Animals cannot lbe 
said to play because they are young and frolicsome, bul rather they have a 
period of youth in order lo play (emphasis his); for only by so doing can they 
supplement lhe insufficient hereditary endowment with individual experience, 
in view of the comings tasks of life. 1112 Groos subsequently is forced to talk of 
the "conscious accompaniments" of play though they be fundamentally irrel­
e\•ant to the question of what play is. That which is closest to man, his sensations 
and cognitions, are discounted in  favor of that which is inaccessible lo him but 
which, on scientific grounds, has to be present. 
Second, it should be noted that those who identify play on biological bases 
must presuppose a given descriptive knowledge of that object. Otherwise, how 
could Groos, for example, claim that play is teleo logical necessity? How could he 
ever discover instances of play? How would he know play when he saw it? 
Clearly, a descriptive understanding is a prerequisite to a scientific hypothesis. 
Too often this prerequisite is ignored or only incompletely acknowledged. 
Finally, but still very importantly, these theories characterize play in con· 
trast to work or serious adult life. Particularly in the cases of Lazarus' notion of 
play as recovery from work and Groos' play as preparation for adult life, play 
is seen as a partner lo work. In essence, play, in these characterizations, is 
highly utilitarian. It marks the accomplishment of tasks as important as those of 
work itself. A possible conclusion to be drawn from this juxtaposition of work 
and play is that such "play" is indeed itself work. "Play" too stands as a major 
contributor to the actualization of important human ends. 
A non-biologically-based correlate of this utilitarian notion o f  play is 
Walsh's13 description o f  play as that which is useful in returning man to a 
recognition of his "possibilities." Play is a means, a way of reinstating man in 
Being-in-lhe-World . 14 How ironic it is that he accuses the compulsive "worker" 
of an inability lo view play as anything but purposeless when it is precisely the 
compulsive worker who cannot conceive of play in anything but terms of 
utility. Again, play is viewed as crucially functional in relationship lo valued 
objectives. 
Another approach is that taken by Willgenstein 15 who claimed that a consid­
eration of games produces understandings labeled "family resemb lances." He en­
treats the reader to "look" at a variety of games and acknowledge the fact that 
he finds nothing common to all but only similarities and relationships. 
Granted, with Wittgenstein's starting point given, one must, if he looks at a 
great enough variety of games, find exceptions to even the best prospective 
common elements. But the question remains as to how Wittgenstein can so 
readily describe the "presence" or "absence" of phenomena such as amuse­
ment, patience and competilion. 16 Are these "proceedings" themselves char­
acterized by "family resemblances?" rr so, his descriptions themselves rest upon 
uncertain, broad similarities. And Qven if this presents no difficulty, the fact 
that phenomena are discounted because they are not always "present" in certain 
culturally-defined social settings seems beside the point in terms of Lhe reality of 
one's cognizance of amusement, competition or whatever. Patience, for examplet 
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is no less a realily by ''irtue or its occasional presence in giver. existential 
siluations. 
With lhis incomplete description of the method and expectations of this 
paper and an analysis of some pre\·ious allernate procedures. the more sub­
!'tantive portion of the paper must be started. Th� reduclmve analysis may strike 
an initial roadblock as one turns his reflective glan<'e toward play. Play is elusive. 
One might as.5\Jme from looking al several pre,·ious analyses that this cognition 
must be characterized as a delimited void. In other words, play has. often been 
described in terms of what it is not. Play is nol serious, not real, dis-connected, 
non-productive, un-neces.sary and so forth. But what is left? To perform a 
reduction on this basis would be to comerl one void into a more sophisticated 
absence. One must e'lentually turn his reflections toward lhat which play is. 
Let. us take, for purposes of analysis, parlicipalion in a basketball game. As a 
player I may first be struck by the fact. Lhat not as much seems to be "al stake" 
as there was while performing as, one might say, a beginning college professor. I 
experience a freedom of separation from worldly concerns. Most obviously, this 
recreational contest does not involve large sums of money, my financial well­
being. But I may immediately sense Lhal this is a rather provincial understanding 
of supposed distinctive realms of activity. Apart from lhe difficulty of distin­
guishing between that which is perso nally necessary and that which is not. it 
would seem that whate,·er the object desired .  whether or not it t'an be shown Lo 
be biologically necessary, psychologically crilical or socially imporlnnl, I en­
counter a fundamentally identical motif. Here 1 stand, lo put it graphically. and 
there •·stands" the objecl o f  my desire, perhaps rood this lime, companionship 
the nexl or victory the nexl. In all cases a something ''out there" as yet un­
secured, as yet not part or myself hangs in the balance of my thrusts toward it. 
Despite the fact tha� £, as a player, can feel that the game has no impact on my 
''real" life, that it is being played "for Hself," J may still stand in wanting 
relationship to a particular object-victory. gtor}, or happiness. to 1ame a few. 
IL would seem that the variously-defined "necessary-unneressary'' dislmndion 
characterizing work and play respective!)' 1s es.5entially one motif. Removing the 
biological, sociological and psychological bases for distinguishing the relative 
value or di fferent projects, l am left wit.h projects of an idenlical character, 
namely-gestures aimed aL securing that which is not mine. 
My unique cogniunce of a freedom from as much being at stake must then be 
based 1.11pon something other than a separation from the various "real necessities" 
catalogued above. When 1 remove the bases for that bogus dislinclion I seem to 
be left with a plain lack of anything missing, or to put it in more posi tive terms, 
a fullness or plenitude. The foundation which gives my cogni6ance distinc­
tiveness is not freedom Crom certain necessities (fol' that may still be essentially 
an orientation toward lhe missing) bul simply freedom fro m absence. Fullness is 
incompatible with the missing. Fullness is incompatible with anything which wiJI 
serve as a complemen t, "savior" or deliverer. Fullness is, however, intelligible in 
relationship to ex-pression, response or testimony. 
One mighl come at this understanding obliquely from another common ex­
perience or his acti\'ity, that of a unique temporalily. I see the game clock on 
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the wall. The clock serves as an indication Lhat my parLicipation will terminate 
after forty minutes of play. This conslitutes the highly arbitrary temporal 
boundaries lo which I commit myself in the contesl. Without needing to. why 
would I engage in the activity of basketball for forty minutes? Furthermore, 
during the game 1 will st.op and start lime by calling "time outs" and subsequent­
ly resuming play. "Real time," it seems, is not lived in relationship to such 
arbitrary ventures. and il cannol be so readily manipulated t.hrough many 
"stops" and "starts". This may be taken by myself as a distinctive characteristic 
of play. 
But again I can intuit a possible identity between this conception of play lime 
and "ordinary" or work lime. Time in either case can be considered as a con­
struction or fabricat.ion in response to an incompleteness which change is 
destined to remedy. In other words, I posit. a "sometime" (either a continuity 
toward a future objective or an historical event) in recognition of my present 
relative destit.ution. This lemporality can be constructed, in principle, as easily in 
response to Lhe change required to gain a viclory as it is to the change needed lo 
gain happiness, financial security or ptestige. 
Time as continuity is invenled when something is seen as "moving" toward a 
specific culmination. Fin kl ?spoke of this teleological phenomenon in terms of 
the striving of a fragmented being for, in his case, Eudaimonia. Man, according 
to Fink, emphasizes the future because it is that which will permit the realiza­
Uon of his objectives.18 This time is irreversible. It is the flight forward to a not 
yet actualized status. As Berger described this alternat.ive, "Having opted for 
time I would think that plenitude ought to be conquered within time."19 The 
clock time o f  the game and t.he work time of futures of fruition are, in the sense 
mentioned here, essentially identical. 
Thus, my distinctive cognition must be based upon a radically different 
conception of time, a time which is not, as has been shown, validly described in 
terms of artificiality. arbitrariness or "lime-in-time-outs." This reduced aware­
ness oftime must acknowledge change (otherwise we have a congealed eternity) 
but change wlnich is not. constructed around a specific sometime. The lempor· 
ality recognized from this standpoint is a "presence"20 or a "thick present.."21 
It is the catching of a fly ball as the catching o f  a Oy ball, not as a temporal point 
in a constructed chain of events which leads to victory. It is the drive for a lay­
up as a drive for a layup. 
Time as a "thick present." includes acts which are more expressions than 
strivings. The present stands in relationship to no specific time of fruition. It 
does not serve as that construction which "carries" man to fullfillment. Thus, 
my implicit acknowledgement of presence in the act of playing basketball 
clarifies that act as an expression or, in the more religious terminology of 
Neale, a celebration. As Berger stated a similar idea, "Time is no longer a milieu 
in which I work and which encloses me but that of which I have something to 
make, ahd my acts are much less work5 than lestimonies."22 
To conclude, the artificial time o:' games can yet be the construcled time 
leading to a sometime of victory, glory or "total bliss." This time is identical 
to work time which likewise provides continuity toward a presently desired andl 
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presently lacking status. Play time is a simple ''birth and death" which issues 
from fullness. 
r can lake a third common orientation toward my participation In basketball. 
I noUce that the game includes artificial spatial boundaries. Black lines outline 
the courl. Play space exists only within Lhose lines. 1 might conclude lhat these 
boundaries partially or whoUy constitute the uniqueness of play. l n  the "real" 
world I encounter no such lines, but only boundaries which signify utility. I do 
not, in my work world, place myself within artificial spaces which, Co· utilitarian 
ends, need not be there. Bui. if I ignore the court lines. may I still maint.ain tn) 
unique cognition of space? l l  seems so. 
To take the position of the antithesis first, one may intuit a possible identity 
between certain acti\ity in artificially-bound space and work space. This space 
is dislocated. IL is space forever related to an "over there" or a "somewhere." 
Whether it be a basketball player who feels .. lost" in not occupying an appro­
priate location ot· a businessman who must trek lo another ciLy lo close a deal, 
the actor stands dislorated, in relationship to another place. Thus, the ball-player 
and business-man may occupy identical spatiality; they both acknowledge a 
specific inapproprialeness or incompleteness relative lo their location. 
The reduced phenomenon is one of man with location nol dislocation. In 
dislinction lo the dichotomous spatiality without a locus, pla} space is full 
locatedness. It is space with a focal point or oeenter. I t  is the full location of ex­
pression. IL is the location under Lhe basket as location under the baskel, not a 
locale which is one point among man} other points. 
Play space is open space because it has a focal point. l l  is not ·'in debt" to 
other pluces. It does not "stand" as a place on a path of places. It  cannot be 
understood, in short, in terms of number. It is the full and open ·'here-with· 
there" as opposed to a 41here" in relationship to a specific number o·· "there's." 
To this point play has been identified as resting upon a base of fullness or 
plenitude and has been described in two of its manifestations, Lemporality and 
spatiality. The fullness of play grounds acts of a different order from those based 
upon incompleteness. The play act, to expand upon one of Neale's points, 
might be called '·adventuring'' in the sense that it is not a curtailed thrust 
toward specific ends. It is abstaining from "\writing the scripl" before t.he fact. 
H is facing lhe unexpected. IL is surprise. lt is testifying spontaneousl) lo one's 
fullness r<!'gardless of the extenuating circumstances in a particular life situation 
(e.g. one might be taking a terrific beating in a basketball game). lL  is the courage 
to remain open to one's possibiliLies. 
Analysis must no\'t be turned more specit'ically Lo sport so that compatiibility 
between playing and that which it intends (sport) can be described My Learn· 
mates and I face rivE opponents on the basketball court and attempt to keep 
them from $coring while we lhwarl their inhibilory lhrusls toward l.S. 
One's first reaction, in light of Lhe previous analysis of play. might be that 
play in connection with the opposition of sport would force an emasculalion 
of the taller phenomenon. Opposition seems to require lhe notion of an 
opponent who stands, as it were, between myself and the co\!eled victory. If r 
am successful in overcoming the opponenL, Lhe prize is mine. Bul Lhe prize re· 
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mains, during the conLest, an objecl which I lack; it 1s won 0111� in the sometime 
if I reach a sufficient number of strategic "somewhere's." Those who compete 
are. by definition, the unfullfilled, the fragmented individuals who contest with 
one another precisely to reetify this situation. In short, il may appear that 
opposition, to retain its competitive fullness, must fall into a work motif. 
Judgment, however, must be suspended until a more careful examination of 
opposition is pursued. Whal is required to mainlain the intelligibility of 
opposition'? First. I recogniz.e the importance of m} opponents. But are those 
specific five people necessary'? Certainly those five indi\'iduals could as easily be 
.another group, and it seems that the actual presence of people themselves may 
not be required. I can compete as readily. in essence, against myself in striving to 
make a greater number of shols from a certain place than I did yesterday. 1 op­
pose, in a sense, a phantom adversary whose presence Is implicit in the record 
(either actual or hypothetical) Lo which I attend. Thus, if the actual presence of 
other persons is  not necessary, I must still recognize, at minimum, some variable­
olher distinct from self. A fundamental dichotomy presents itself. I cannot, in 
short, think of opposition without considering tlla t which is opposed. 
It is most important to nole that this other need not be that which 1 want to 
become or that which threatens my acquiring something else which I lack. This 
point needs to be argued. Beside the self-evident fact that the oppositional 
dichotomy must be a variable one (I must change in m) attempts to oppose you. 
and you must change-either actualJy as I face you or virtual!) through your 
record to which l attend-to oppose me. I cannot oppose an inanimate objecL 
such as a mountain.), opposition seems lo require the presence of theme. The 
polarities of the dicttotom) require that which will assure intersection. 'fheme is 
often manifest in spatial, temporal and intentional phenomena. We share a given 
space; we share a given lime; we share a certain kind of project. Quite clearly the 
other in this dichotomy must be set:n as a cooperator, as Suits,23 Fraleigh,24 
.and others have indicated, befok'e opposition becomes intelligible" A view of the 
other, at least in terms of this prerequisite or theme, as the embodiment of 
something which I want lo become or as that which holds me in my possible in­
completeness is not required. 
But this intersecting, \1arlable dichotomy betrays another characteristic, that.. 
of hindrance. It is here that the appatent incompatibility between full play and 
full opposition seems to shine through most brightly. When one considers hin­
drance he must think of hindrance from something. In basketball I am hindered 
from either scoring points or blocking other persons' attempts lo do the same. 
In this sense opposition does include a recognition or the not-yel completed or 
negotiated. If  this is the only way in which I can understand hindrance, then 1 
am indeed blocked from that which w.11 complete me, that which constitutes my 
fullrillment. l f  this is the only way in which I can understand hindrance. then I 
am condemned to perpetual worlung sport toward salbfaction. 
Such a re<.'Ognition of hindrance serves as a reminder that J may remain tor· 
E>ver discordant, fragmentary or insufficient. Hindrance blocks the path to the 
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Paradoxically this hindrance is still necessary in the sense that it is required 
for the successful termination of the work-quest. Happiness cannot be gained 
unless one overcomes something, unless one prevails in spite of hindrance. 
Hindrance, therefore, is al once feared and b1eeded. 
Hindrance in this work ethos is a result of minimal sharing under the pre­
requisite of theme. Only those necessities which allow projecting polarities to 
intersect are in evidence. Cooperation is merely condoned as a means Lo an 
end. 1 cooperate with the other onl} in the extent to which it allows me lo gain 
that which is lacking, that from which I am hindered. 
But the question remains whether or not the made basket or successful block 
of another's shot need be only that which I lack, lhat which I am only hindered 
from. Il seems that hindrance from is also a hindrance for and lhat under this 
notion the compatibility of play and opposition becomes more apparent. I may 
be hindered from making baskets, but such hindrance allows me Lo ex press my 
testimony. I express myself with hindrance, not through or in spite of  hindrance. 
lL is valued for Itself. 
Hindrance in this mode is not threatening, for it blocks nothing which is 
lacking. It is rather lo be preserved because continued testimony depends upon 
its presence. This does not suggest that I do not try to convert bru.kets. ft merely 
indicates that "victory" is a continuously unfolding experience. U is my ex­
pression, noL a pre-existent object which l somehow secure :for myself. 
Such hindrance also has implications for the concept of theme. Theme is not 
a minimal agreement bul rather a maximal cooperation. The recognition is one 
of mulual dependence. I need the hindrance you can offer for my expression, 
and you need the hindrance I provide for your testimony. We do not have the 
ambivalence of the worker on a quest who needs us only to surpass us in his 
conquest, who both searches us out and fears us, who wants our resistance only 
to ultimately "annihilate" that force. 
MeLheny's discussion on the etymology of "contest" (a derivation of con 
and testare meaning to1 testify with) is instmctive.25 When one leslifies, he ex­
presses or displays that which he has whether it be knowledge, physical prowess, 
faith or some other ability or trail. He "lays ouL" his particular or unique full­
ness. Thus, the physically contesting indh'idual, in the true sense or the term, 
displays lhat which is bis, his particular grace, his particular strength, his parlic­
ular agility. In the contest, one is indeed hindered for. 
Two motifs of opposition have been ouUined, each one, in principle, equally 
intelligible in that dichotomy, variation, theme and hindrance are acknow�edged. 
The work schema includes a characterization of the other (dichotomy) as 
minimally cooperative (variation-theme) and as that which stands between 
(hindrance) me and my objective. Victory or defeat is something distinct from 
my unfolding self which I, at a future time, gain. The other must be eliminated 
for my goal to be secured. 
On the other hand the play impulse requires a characterization of the other 
(dichotomy) as fully and essentially cooperative (variation-theme) in lhc mode 
of inhibi1ting me (hindrance) for a certain expression. The hindering other needs 
to be preserved, for expression ends when a verdict is reached, when the other 
120 
9
Kretchmar: Ontological Possibilties: Sport as Play
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1972
SCO'IT KRETCHMAR 
is "destroyed" or when Lhe olher "dl'slroys" me. 
The analysis needs to be carried furthoi· to include a discussion of physical 
contributions to oppositional projects. I intuit, on the court. a certain relevancy 
in terms of my movements or slatic positions. I am too early, on time, too far 
downcourt or positioned correctly. Self as body is lived as strategic for changes 
desired. 
It seems evident that relevancy could retain its nature of strategic relation­
ship in either the play or work motif. l\Iy body limitedness temporally and 
spatially cou Id be conceived of as strategic in terms of my desire to exhibit my 
particular fullness. Or this limitedness could be relevant in terms of a future 
objective. 
As indicated above, my body relevancy in expression would be a relevancy in 
the "now," a becoming which paradoxically requires no construction of futures 
in which something is to be gained. Likewise my relevancy with regard to loca­
tion is a relevancy for lhe "here." the locale of my unfoldjng expression. In 
psychological terminology this total experience of body relevancy in play can be 
described as "grace. 1126 Play relevancy is complete relevancy. There is no rela­
tionship lo other changes needed. 
l\Iy relevant temporal and spatial aclion in work, on the other hand, is rele­
vancy related to the "not here" and the "not yet." Relevancy is understood as 
thal which can be done as body, changes which can be provoked, conclusions 
which can be achieverl. Relevancy is always incomplete relevancy. It stands in 
relationship Lo the unaccomplished. 
In drawing these ideal distinction; between one's consciousness of play and 
work it is not being suggested lhal one's lived experience in any situation would 
include the pure content of one or the other phenomenon. In playing a ball game 
an individual's lived experience may be grounded in play one moment and in 
work the next. Likewise while "on Lhe job" a person may alternate between 
playing and working and live the nuances of both. 
In reflecting upon personal lived experiences in terms of the above analysis, 
we may have more difficulty discovering instances of full play than work. ll 
seems that when we interact, even on the "play" field, we often stand in rela­
tionship to yet other things which are desired. We work at basketball to gain the 
victory; we work at jogging to feel better; we work at taking vacations to find 
relaxation. 
The schema of opposition may be particularly vulnerable to the work motif 
because it provides an other which presents an image of hindrance. Our common 
response is to assume that hindrance stands in the way of something which we 
lack. We may encounter opposition at the office, for example, and respond to it 
in terms of self-preservation, self-advancement and self-gratification. Thus, many 
of us, even those in physical education and others who profess an allegiance to 
sport, have difficulty playing. 
ll may be significant that several theorists consider dance a more viable form 
for the manifeslation of play. Huizinga stated this directly, " . . .  dance . . .  is 
always at all periods and with all peoples pure play, the purest and most perfect 
form of play that exists.,,27 And Van der Leeuw wrote, "When something 
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mat.ters in l ife, one feels fest.ive; the expression of life becomes stylized into a 
fixed, rhythmical form.1128 Or as Neale pul it. quite simply, "To play (emphasis 
mine) a game is Lo dance.1129 
Thus, it may be the rare performer who consistently plays sport, though on 
the basis of this analysis such an activity was found to be wholly intelligible. lt. 
is the playing sportsman whose cup "runneth over" and whose becomjng is more 
an adventurous celebration than a det.ermined quesl. 
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